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effect of the provisions can be summed up by saying that they
all attempt to put an end to flagrant abuse situations that had
arisen when the rate structures and jurisdictional concepts of
foreign countries for taxing income did not meet, or overlapped
the rate structures and jurisdictional concepts of the United
States for taxing income. Of course, taxpayers may not be
unanimous in the feeling that all situations covered by the 1962
Act constituted abuses.
Time limitations and the complexity of many of the foreign
provisions make it inadvisable to discuss, or even mention, the
several provisions.
Other Provisions
The Revenue Act of 1962 also contains several other provisions of lesser importance or of more limited application. The
scope of this paper precludes reference to these provisions.
THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF EDUCATIONAL
EXPENSES UNDER §162(a) OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
JOHN

J. HAREINGTON

The Internal Revenue Code and the Commissioner's Regulations 1 allow as a deduction from Gross Income2 educational
expenses incurred by a taxpayer, within certain specific limits.
The authority for such a deduction being a section of the Code
dealing with deductions for the ordinary and necessary expenses
of a trade or business, the case law and the Regulations relative
to the deductibility of educational expenses have followed
closely the developing concepts of "ordinary and necessary"
business expenses.
Code § 162(a) provides that "there shall be allowed as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business . . ." The Regulations, in general, develop the theory
1 INT. REV. CODE
2

of 1954, § 162(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958).
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 62(1); Rev. Rul. 97, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 69,75.
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that in order for an educational expense to be deductible, it
must either be (1) incurred to maintain or improve skills
required by the taxpayer in his employment or other trade or
business, or (2) be an express requirement of the taxpayer's
employer or applicable law or regulations, imposed as a condition to the retention of the taxpayer's salary, status or employment.3 This Regulation was first adopted in 19584 and was
made retroactive to affect all 1954 Code years. 5
The detail of the current Regulations is in wide contrast to
those prevailing under the 1939 Code, which provided only
that "expenses of taking special courses or training" or expenses incurred" .. . in placing oneself in a position to begin
rendering personal services for compensation" are not deductible. 1 Prior to the 1954 Code and the promulgation of both the
proposed and final Regulations thereunder, a taxpayer who was
in doubt as to the deductibility of his educational expenses
had to refer mainly to court decisions on the point.
An initial philosophical stumbling-block for those seeking
the deduction of educational expenses was set up by Justice
Cardozo in oft-quoted dicta from Welch v. Helvering.7 The
money spent in acquiring learning, declared Justice Cardozo,
is not an ordinary expense of business, but is more in the nature
of a non-depreciable capital asset. This position was adhered to
without exception until 1950. 8
A precedent-breaking decision was finally handed down in
1950 by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Hill case. 9
The factual situation involved a Virginia high school teacher
who attended a summer session at Columbia University, and
sought deductibility of $250 of her expenses under section 162.
The Tax Court had denied such deductibility o on the ground
3 Treas. Reg. 1.162-5(a)(1) and (2) (1958).
4 T. D. 6291, 1958-1 CUM. BULL. 63.
5 T.I.R. 76, April 11, 1958, 5CCH 1958 STAND. FED. TAX REP. V6445.
6 Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(a)-15 (0(1939).
7 290 U. S. 111 (1933).
8 58 COL. L. REV. 1097 (1958).
9 Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F. 2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
1o

Nora Payne Hill, 13 T. C. 291 (1949).
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that the school teacher had had an option under state law of
either reading and being examined on five books, or procuring
credits in summer school, under the State Department of
Education Regulations, and that there was no showing that
the method pursued by the teacher was ordinarily followed by
others in similar circumstances. Although attending summer
school was an alternative requirement of the taxpayer's employer, it was not the one necessary method of retaining her
position and there was no showing that it was ordinary. In
reversing, the Court of Appeals held that it would be unreasonable to require the taxpayer to give a statistical showing
that is was more usual for other teachers to elect to attend
summer school rather than to read five approved books.
Instead, the Fourth Circuit promulgated a broader test. "If
the particular course adopted by the taxpayer is a response that
a reasonable person would normally and naturally make under
the specific circumstances,", 1 it would be a sufficient basis for
permitting deductibility. Moreover, the Circuit Court found,
from all the circumstances, that the taxpayer attended the summer session in order to maintain her present position and not
in order to attain a new one. Accordingly, the court had little
trouble in holding an ancient Service pronouncement12
inapplicable to such a situation. Where the ruling cited by the
Tax Court had categorically declared that "the expenses incurred by school teachers in attending summer school are in the
nature of personal expenses incurred in advancing their education and are not deductible," '1 3 the Circuit Court in Hill
tacitly rewrote the ruling to deny deductibility only when the
summer school expense was of a personal nature. By placing
its emphasis on the state requirements relative to the retention
of her teaching position by the taxpayer, the appellate court
easily found the summer school expense to be of a nonpersonal
nature.
The Fourth Circuit cautioned, however, that it was by no
means holding that all summer school expenses would be permitted deductibility by all taxpayers; the test of ordinary and
necessary would still have to be met. A case which is factually
1 Hill v. Commissioner, supra note 9 at 908.
12 O.D. 892, 4 CUM. BULL. 209 (1921).
13 Ibid.
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distinguishable from Hill was not long in coming. An industrial engineer took courses in Administrative Engineering and
sought a deduction for his tuition and carfare as an ordinary
and necessary educational expense. 1 4 The Tax Court found, on
the basis of the taxpayer's testimony that he received greater
earnings as a result of his studies, that the expense was incurred
either to improve the taxpayer's professional status or his
personal educational attainment level, and were non-deductible
even under the Hill ruling, since there was no necessity for the
taxpayer to incur the expense in order to keep his job. Similar
results were attained in other cases in which a taxpayer with a
claimed educational expense deduction sought to widen the
scope of Hill. In Cardozo, - a college professor voluntarily
took a trip to Europe for the purpose of study and research. In
denying the deduction for the expenses of the trip, the Tax
Court pointed out that there was no requirement of the college
that the professor even conduct research in order to maintain
his position, although this had a great deal of influence on his
subsequent promotion. The Cardozo case has been criticized for
its failure to look beyond the express written requirements of
the university to the frequently unwritten policy of higher
educational institutions that the retention of professors, as well
as promotions, hinge largely on their published research, and
hence, the ordinary and necessary requirements really are present. 1 6 This criticism, however, seems more properly directed
at the refusal of the Tax Court to take judicial notice of the
employment policies of universities, in the absence of any
showing by the taxpayer as to such policies, than against the
legal principle followed in Cardozo. A similar result was
obtained where a college professor sough to deduct certain
expenses connected with his doctor's dissertation, but admitted
that this activity was not required of him in order to hold his
present position. 17
The Commissioner expressed his approval of the Hill case
and those which followed its doctrine by modifying his thirty14

Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956 (1950).

15 Manoel Cardozo, 17 T.C. 3 (1951).
16 H. Helmut Loring, Some Tax Problems of Students andScholars, 45 CAL. L. REV.

153, 157 (1957).
17 Richard Henry Lampkin, 3 P-H 1952 FED. TAX SERV.

52,173.
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year-old ruling that all summer school expenses were personal,18 to permit deductions by teachers for educational
expenses where they were for the purpose of maintaining an
existing position, rather than for obtaining a higher position or
qualifying for a permanent status. 10 The initial breach in
the wall of non-deductibility having been opened by the
decision in Hill, others soon appeared in related areas. Again
it was a Circuit Court which led the offensive. The case of
Coughlin v. Commissioner2o was decided by the Second Circuit
in 1953 and permitted a deduction as an ordinary and necessary
business expense the expenditures made for tuition, travel,
board and lodging by a practicing attorney who attended the
New York University Institute on Federal Taxation. The Tax
Court had disallowed such a deduction on the ground that the
attorney was pursuing "an educational and personal" object. 21
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, found that although the
knowledge gained by the attorney at the Institute may have
"incidentally increased his fund of learning in general, and, in
that sense, the cost of acquiring it may have been a personal
expense ...the immediate over-all professional need to incur
the expenses in order to perform his work with due regard to the
current status of the law so overshadows the personal aspect
that it is the decisive factor.'-22 In short, the Circuit Court
found that it was both ordinary and necessary for a tax lawyer
to keep abreast of current developments in the tax field in order
to maintain his professional position.
With the adoption of the 1954 Code, "proposed" Regulations were promulgated by the Commissioner. These were
much less liberal than the present 1962 Regulations. Prior to
1958, the Regulations permitted an educational expense
deduction if "the degree of business necessity ... clearly outweighed any personal aspects of the expenditure" in addition to
being "ordinary and necessary". 23 The pre-1958 Regulation
18 O.D. 892, 4 CUM. BULL. 209 (1921).
19 I.T. 4044, 1951-1 CUM. BULL. 16.
20
21
22
23

Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F. 2d 307 (2d Cit. 1953).
George C. Coughlin, 18 T.C. 528 (1952).
Coughlin v. Commissioner, supra note 20, at 309.
Proposed Treas. Reg. 1.162-5(b)(1), 21 Fed. Reg. 5091 (1956).
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listed situations in which no deduction would be allowed in any
event:
Expenditures for education which are made primarily for
the purpose of, or which have the result of, obtaining a
position for the taxpayer; qualifying him to enter an employment or otherwise become established in a trade or
business or specialty therein; establishing or enhancing
substantially his reputation in his trade or business;
substantially advancing him in earning capacity, salary,
status or position; or primarily fulfilling the general cultural
aspirations or other personal purposes of the taxpayer are
personal expenditures and are not deductible. 24
Although most of this philosophy has found its way into
the post-1958 Regulations, it is no longer necessary for the
"degree of business necessity to clearly outweigh any personal
aspects" under the facts of a particular situation; it is now
sufficient to show only that the expense was incurred primarily
as an ordinary and necessary business expense, even though
there was a substantial personal benefit to the taxpayer as well.
A "dual purpose" of personal and business benefits no longer
disqualifies a deduction per se, so long as the primary purpose
remains that of an ordinary and necessary business expense. It
has been stated by the Tax Court2 5 that the principal effect
of the liberalized Regulations was to remove the distinction
previously made between self-employed individuals, whose
educational expenses were generally considered to be personal
in nature by the Service and non-deductible, and employees,
for whom necessary business reasons for indulging in the
educational activity were more easily found.
The current Regulations state specifically that, as a general
rule, "a taxpayer's expenditures for travel (including travel
while on sabbatical leave) as a form of education shall be considered as primarily personal in nature and therefore not deductible."2 G In court assaults on this position, the taxpayer has
generally been unsuccessful. Thus, in Seibold,2 7 (decided under
24 Proposed Treas. Reg. 1.162-5(a)(2), 21 Fed. Reg. 5091 (1956).
25 Cosimo A. Carlucci, 37 T.C. 695 (1962).
26 Treas. Reg. 1.162-5(c) (1958).
27 31 T.C. 1017 (1959).
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the 1939 Code but after the promulgation of the "final" Regulations under the 1954 Code) the taxpayer was a music teacher
in a public school system who had to secure certain credits in
order to validate his teaching certificate to maintain and preserve his present position. He was permitted an election between going to school to obtain the credits, or taking an
educational sight-seeing trip of Europe for which he would be
granted credit. He elected to follow the latter course. In
denying the taxpayer a deduction for the cost of the European
jaunt, the Tax Court drew the line at any attempted extension
of the Hill case 28 which would classify an expense such as this
as "ordinary and necessary." The Court agreed that it was
necessary for the teacher to secure his credits, but did not
think an European sight-seeing tour was the ordinary method of
doing so.
A similar result was reached in the later case of Thomas P.
Dennehy,29 which involved another summer tour of Europe,
this time by a mathematics instructor at a university. In this
case, the court refused even to find the tour necessary, let alone
ordinary, even though the taxpayer would have been subjected
to some type of "sanctions" by the university if he failed to
make the trip. The "sanctions" were in the form of a denial of
promotion and a pay increase, and hence, there was no compulsion on him to make the trip in order to maintain a presently-held position.
On the other hand, the Tax Court has allowed the expenses
of an European trip for educational purposes to be deducted as
an ordinary and necessary business expense where the taxpayer
was an art and geography teacher in an elementary school.3o
Although the taxpayer visited "common tourist attractions,"
the Court distinguished the Siebold case 31 by finding here a
"definite and logical relationship to the teaching of geography"
and art. 32
Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F. 2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 61,151 (1961).
30 Evelyn L. Sanders, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 60,061 (1960).
28

29

31 31 T.C. 1017 (1959)
32

Supra note 30.
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A late case 3 presents a troublesome borderline problem in
this area. A college professor sought deductibility of his
expenses in making a trip to England in order to conduct research on a book he was writing. The majority opinion of the
Tax Court, six judges dissenting, disallowed a deduction on a
finding that the professor was not required by the college to
undertake the research project. Although the majority agreed
that the college "expressed an interest in research" and "encouraged it," great stress was laid on the fact that the professor had
permanent tenure and hence, his present position was in no
danger if he failed to conduct the research. In a vigorous dissent, however, the minority argues that the majority proceeded
on a fundamental misunderstanding of the scope of the applicable statute. It is insisted strongly by the dissent that it is
quite beside the point whether or not the professor had achieved
permanent tenure. The dissenters found the trip to be both
ordinary and necessary in spite of the precedent of Cardozo,
ordinary because of a tradition and commonly recognized
expectation of the college "that members of its faculty engage
in research and writing in their respective areas of academic
interest;" 4 necessary because of indirect pressure by fellow
faculty members and administration officials to produce research, although this was not specifically called for in the contract of employment. The case is on appeal as of January 15,
1963, to the Ninth Circuit and whether a further extension of
"ordinary and necessary" concepts in the field of educational
expense deduction will be forthcoming is of course unpredictable.
Not all the attempts for an educational expense deduction
are made by those engaged in the profession of teaching.
Especially since the enactment of the liberalized Regulations in
1958, persons engaged in other professions, generally on a selfemployment basis, have attempted to avail themselves of this
means of cutting their tax bills. Attorneys form a typical professional group for whom such deductions may be permitted.
A typical factual situation is that of the Bistline case, 3 5 wherein
the taxpayer was an attorney in Idaho who travelled to New
33

Harold H. Davis, 38 P-H Tax Ct. Rep.

34

Id. at 156.

38.20 (1962).

35 Bistline v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 802 (D. Idaho, 1956).
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York for a two-week course in Federal Taxation at the Practicing
Law Institute. A District Court, without much discussion of
the point, permitted him to deduct his tuition, cost of books,
hotel and travel expenses as a business expense. Presumably
the Court felt that the tax course enrollment was for the purpose
of allowing the attorney to maintain his position in his chosen
field. A contrary result was reached and a deduction denied by
the Tax Court where the facts showed that the purpose of the
attorney in attending New York University tax courses was to
enable him to secure a position in a legal partnership prospectively being formed, in which he was to handle the tax work. 3 0
The Tax Court followed the Regulations in denying a deduction
for an expense incurred in obtaining an education for the
primary purpose of obtaining a new position.
A deduction is also disallowed by the courts, as well as the
Regulations, where the education results in a new skill, one not
required of the taxpayer as a condition to the retention of his
salary, status or employment. Thus, the costs of a National
Labor Relations Board field examiner in pursuing law school
courses were non-deductible where he did no legal work for the
Board and legal training was not a pre-requisite to the retention
of his position. .37 Such an expense is of an inherently personal
nature. A similar result was reached in the case of a research
chemist who attended law school in order to secure a new
position as a patent chemist, rather than merely maintaining
his current status. 38
Psychiatrists were denied educational deductions in two
recent cases where the court found the expenses had been
essentially incurred to permit the taxpayers to obtain new
positions. In Namrow, 3, the specific reason two psychiatrists
took psychoanalytic courses was to attain the minimum requirements needed in order to practice psychoanalysis. The
Court held that psychoanalysis was a new and different skill
from psychiatry as a matter of fact, in an opinion devoted
mainly to definitions of these terms. In Gilmore,40 the taxpayer sought to distinguish her situation from that in the
36 Joseph T. Booth, 35 T.C. 1144 (1961).

3 Louis Aronin, 30 P-H Tax Cc. Mem. 61,180 (1961).
38 Sandt v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 111 (3rd Cir., 1962).
39
40

Namrow v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 648 (4th Cir., 1961).
38 P-H Tax Ct. Rep. 38.76 (1962).
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Nanrow case by claiming that since she was already well
established in her profession, rather than close to the inception
of her career as the psychiatrists in Namrow had been, her
primary purpose in taking psychoanalysis courses must have
been to improve her skill as a teacher and practitioner of
psychiatry. The Court concluded that there was no such distinction and that psychiatry and psychoanalysis are essentially
different, although not totally unrelated skills. A subsidiary
contention that her employer encouraged her study, whereas in
Namrow the psychiatrists acted on their own, was also rejected
as immaterial by the Tax Court, since encouragement is a far
cry from a requirement.
A novel question presented for the determination of the
courts in 1961 was whether a teacher's expenditures for the
acquisition of college credits which admittedly permitted him
to continue teaching were disallowable because the credits were
also applicable to the awarding of a law degree to the taxpayer. 4 1 A District Court concluded that a dual purpose on the
part of a taxpayer did not preclude the existence of a primary
purpose of the taxpayer if at the time he took the courses his
purpose was the retention of his job as a school teacher.
The Tax Court has also recently allowed the deduction, as
an ordinary and necessary educational expense, of the cost of
college courses taken by a Certified Public Accountant and college professor of accountancy, in certain allied fields to his subject, such as management, marketing, and transportation.42
The Tax Court held these were closely related to the field in
which the taxpayer was teaching and his primary purpose in
taking such courses was the improvement and maintenance of
his skill as a teacher. The fact that such credits could be
ultimately applied to a master's degree did not detract from this
primary purpose, especially in light of the fact that a master's
degree was not a requirement of obtaining a position by the taxpayer, it having been waived by the college authorities.
Two final cases which seem to extend the liberal policy of
the courts and the current Regulations even further, with regard
to teachers, remain to be considered. Again we find a Circuit
Court of Appeals blazing a new trail. In the case of Devereaux v.
41 Michaelson v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Wash. 1961).
4 2

James E. Lane, P-H Tax Ct. Mem.

62,179 (1962).
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Commissioner,4. a deduction was allowed by the Third Circuit
for certain costs of an assistant professor in obtaining a Ph.D.
degree. The degree was not required by the college in order for
the taxpayer to obtain his job; it was required for him to attain
permanent tenure in his present position. The Tax Court, in
denying the deduction, equated permanent tenure with a new
position. In reversing, the Circuit Court of Appeals placed its
emphasis on the belief of the taxpayer, in the light of newly
promulgated university regulations, that he would not be
granted permanent tenure unless he obtained a Ph.D. degree,
and that the university would not reappoint him unless he
began taking steps toward attaining permanent tenure. Thus,
the Tax Court viewed the question of permanent tenure as the
granting of a new and different position, while the Circuit
Court, in a more liberal frame of mind, found the same position
with a different status. The Tax Court seems to have followed
the cue. In a case decided one year later,44 the question of
whether the taxpayer was required to incur certain educational
expenses to remain in her job was not even in issue. The Tax
Court found that the only detriment to the school teacher
stemming from a failure to obtain certain credits would be her
ineligibility to participate in salary increases. She could remain
securely in her job at her present salary despite her failure to get
credits. Nevertheless, the Tax Court permitted a deduction,
finding that the teacher was only maintaining a presently
existing right to future salary advances, which would be lost
to her if she did not obtain the credits. If such extensions of the
settled principles relating to permissible educational expense
deductions as these are allowed to stand by higher court,
another major breakthrough in a category of expenditures
which were once considered totally non-deductible personal
expenses may be in the offing.
In conclusion, it must be emphasized that, although the
Regulations were liberalized in 1958, still it is a necessity that
any attempted educational expense deduction be able to withstand the scrutiny of "ordinary and necessary business expense"
concepts. The taxpayer who ignores these concepts and relies
instead on an isolated and non-acquiesced court decision must
be prepared for the burdens of litigation in order to sustain his
deduction.
43 Devereaux v. Commissioner, 292 F. 2d 637 (3rd Cir. 1961).
44 Ruth Donmigan Truxall, P-H Tax Ct. Mere. 62,137 (1962).

